Abstract. Attribute-based encryption scheme is a scheme in which each user is identified by a set of attributes, and some function of those attributes is used to determine decryption ability for each ciphertext. Similar with identity-based encryption scheme, attribute-based schemes are also confronted with key escrow problem. Furthermore, the attributes belonging to a user usually are monitored by different authorities. This paper resolves the two problems by using a general attribute-based encryption scheme and K-Sibling intractable function families. In our construction, different attributes sets of a user are still certified by different authorities, but the partial private keys corresponding to the attributes are generated by a central authority. Simultineously, different authorities jointly generate the users' secret value which cannot be obtained by the central authority. Compared with general multi-authourity attributed-based encryption scheme, our approach has more efficiency.
Introduction
With the development of the internet, expressive access-control is becoming more and more a key technology, where access decisions depend upon attributes of the protected data and access policies assigned to users. A natural solution for expressive access-control is attribute-based encryption (ABE) introduced by Sahai and Waters [1] . Following, two variants of ABE were subsequently proposed: key-policy variant (KP-ABE) of Goyal, Pandey, Sahai and Waters (GPSW) [2] and ciphertext-policy variant (CP-ABE) of Bethencourt, Sahai and Waters (BSW) [3] . In order to make the access structure more expressive, many schemes have been presented [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] . Simultaneously, schemes [6, 9, 10, 11] were devoted to get constant-size ciphertexts.
With the increasing number of international cooperation among different organization and department, the attributes belonging to a user usually are monitored by different authorities. Furthermore, similar to identity-based encryption schemes, the attribute-based schemes encounters key escrow problem. One approach to mitigate the above two problems is to employ multi-authority attribute-based encryption scheme, which is an attractive solution and successfully avoids placing trust in a single entity by making the system distributed. However, this solution comes at the cost of introducing extra infrastructure and communication.
Related Work
Building on the ideas from [12] , Chase proposed a solution for multi-authority attribute-based encryption, provided that a trusted central authority is available [13] , but a global identifier is a "linchpin" for tying users' keys together. Müller, Katzenbeisser, and Eckert [14, 15] give a system with a centralized authority that realizes any LSSS access structure. Their proof is limited to non-adaptive queries. The system achieves roughly the same functionality as the engineering approach above, except one can still acquire attributes from additional authorities without revisiting the central authority. The scheme [16] removed the central authority using a distributed PRF, however, the same limitations of an AND policy of a determined set of authorities remained. Lin et. al. [17] give a threshold-based scheme that is also somewhat decentralized. The set of authorities is fixed ahead of time, and they must interact during the system setup. Scheme [18] proposes a new multi-authority attribute-based encryption system. 
Preliminaries
, be a family of functions that is one-way, polynomial time computable and samplable, and that has the collision accessibility property. Also let and the sample space of all finite strings of coin flips that F could have tossed.
A General Construction for Multi-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption Scheme
We assume that there are n attribute authorities, and every attribute authority k monitors k d attributes, and there are r users. Let (Setup'; SecretKeyExtract'; Encryption'; Decryption') be an IND-CPA secure attribute-based encryption scheme, { } n H H n N = : ∈ be a k -sibling intractable function family, where
∈ is a pseudo-random function families, where
∈ is a one-way trapdoor function family,
. Let (Setup; PartialPrivateKeyExtract; SetSecretValue; SetPrivateKey; SetPublicKey; Encrypt; Decrypt) be the attribute-based certificateless encryption scheme from the above attribute-based encryption scheme, k -sibling intractable function families and one-way trapdoor function, and the construction is as follows: -SetUp: Central authority runs Setup' of attribute-based encryption scheme to get the master secret key msk and master public key mpk . The master public key mpk includes a description of the ciphertext space C . i k h y x k n i r = , = , , , , = , , , and publish h , then each authority can compute x , and x is sent to entity i A as his temporary secret key.
-SetPrivateKey: Given master public key mpk , the entity ' 
Otherwise outputs ⊥ . 
Concrete Attribute-Based Encryption Scheme Secure against the Malicious KGC Construction

Let ( )
The master key is:
Every attribute authority k generates his own signature secret key k s and verifying secret key k v .
-AuthorityCertify: in order to certify the attribute 
,
-Decryption.: Suppose that a ciphertext, C is encrypted with a key for attributes set ω′ and we have the partial private key 
Correctness: 
The Security Analysis 
set 1 {0} S = Γ ∪ .
(13) We can randomly define the secret key for 1 Γ as follows:
Where i s is chosen randomly. For
Where i λ is chosen randomly. B can define the other secret key i D :
∏ ∏ From the above analysis, we find that the advantage of B is equal to the advantage of A . Theorem 2. If f is one-way trapdoor function and h is a k -sibling intractable function, then our attribute-based encryption scheme is secure against malicious central authority.
Conclusion
In order to mitigate the key escrow, this paper gives a new approach which adds new secret value to the user by the attribute authorities, and the central authority doesn't know the secret value. Compared with the general multi-authority attribute-based encryption scheme, our approach is simple, and the length of the cipertext and the public key published to the sender is not increased.
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